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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the thesis is to study the effect of information problems on the valuation 
of cash holdings. The thesis extends previous research from two aspects. Firstly, the 
thesis takes into account the growth opportunities of a firm and examines the effect on 
the valuation of cash. Secondly, earlier research regarding the interrelation of 
asymmetric information and the valuation of cash has mainly been conducted with 
international samples, whereas this thesis takes a single-market perspective and focuses 
only on US firms. 
 
DATA 
The data of this study consists of 815 firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange 
between 1999 and 2009, a total of 5,596 firm-year observations. The valuation 
regression analyzes the total market value of the firm as the dependent variable against 
control variables for earnings, net assets, R&D expenses, interest expenses and 
dividends. The firm-specific degree of asymmetric information is measured by an index 
that combines four proxies: (1) error in analysts’ forecasts, (2) forecast dispersion, (3) 
the number of analysts following the firm, and (4) firm size. All data comes from 
Thomson One Banker: regression variables are taken from the Worldscope- database 
and the analyst forecasts are from I/B/E/S- database. 
 
RESULTS 
First, the study finds that the market value of a marginal dollar of cash is close to par 
i.e. one dollar. This confirms the results of earlier research. Secondly, the thesis finds 
that asymmetric information does not have a significant effect on the valuation of cash 
for an average firm. However, information problems are found to have a significant 
negative effect on the valuation of cash for firms with low growth opportunities. Results 
do not suggest a distinct effect for high growth opportunity firms. 
 
Previous evidence for a negative valuation of cash under asymmetric information is in 
the sample found to occur only for firms with low growth opportunities. The results 
support the agency cost theory and the free cash flow problem. 
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INFORMAATIO-ONGELMIEN JA KASVUMAHDOLLISUUKSIEN VAIKUTUS 
YHTIÖN KASSAVAROJEN ARVOSTUKSEEN 
 
 
TUTKIMUKSEN TARKOITUS 
Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia informaatio-ongelmien vaikutusta yhtiön 
kassavarojen arvostukseen. Tutkielman jatkaa aikaisempaa kirjallisuutta kahdesta 
näkökulmasta. Ensinnäkin, tutkielma huomioi kasvumahdollisuuksien vaikutuksen 
kassavarojen arvostukseen. Toiseksi, aikaisempi kirjallisuus, joka tutkii asymmetrisen 
informaation ja kassavarojen välistä yhteyttä on pääosin tehty kansainvälisellä 
aineistolla. Tämä tutkielma keskittyy tutkimaan vain Yhdysvaltalaisia yrityksiä. 
  
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Lähdeaineisto koostuu 815 New Yorkin pörssissä listatusta yhtiöstä vuosien 1999 ja 
2009 väliltä, yhteensä 5596 yritysvuodesta. Analyysissä tutkitaan selitettävänä 
muuttujana yrityksen kokonaismarkkina-arvoa tuloksen, nettovarojen, T&K- kulujen, 
korkokulujen sekä osinkojen avulla. Yrityskohtaisen asymmetrisen informaation määrää 
mitataan indeksillä, joka koostuu neljästä muuttujasta: analyytikkojen ennustevirheestä, 
ennusteiden hajonnasta, yritystä seuraavien analyytikkojen määrästä sekä yrityksen 
koosta. Kaikki data tulee Thomson One Banker:n kautta. Regression muuttujat otetaan 
Worldscope- tietokannasta ja analyytikkojen ennusteet I/B/E/S- tietokannasta. 
 
TULOKSET 
Ensiksi, tutkielman tulokset osoittavat, että marginaalinen dollari käteistä on markkina-
arvoltaan lähellä yhtä dollaria. Tämä vahvistaa aikaisempien tutkimusten tulokset. 
Toiseksi, tuloksista käy ilmi, että asymmetrisellä informaatiolla ei ole merkittävää 
vaikutusta kassavarojen arvostukseen keskimäärin. Tulokset kuitenkin osoittavat, että 
asymmetrisellä informaatiolla on merkittävä negatiivinen vaikutus matalan 
kasvumahdollisuuksien omaaviin yrityksiin. Korkean kasvumahdollisuuksien yrityksiin 
informaatio-ongelmilla ei tuloksien mukaan ole merkittävää vaikutusta. 
 
Tutkielman vahvistaa aikaisemmat todisteet asymmetrisen informaation negatiivisesta 
vaikutuksesta kassavarojen arvostukseen vain osittain. Lähdeaineistossa tämä vaikutus 
rajoituu vain matalan kasvumahdollisuuksien omaaviin yrityksiin. Löydökset tukevat 
agenttikustannusten ja ns. vapaan kassavirran teoriaa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The amount of cash held by firms has increased significantly during the last few decades. 
This is evident from the recent study by Bates et al. (2009), reporting that the average cash 
ratio has more than doubled from 1980 to 2006. Similar phenomenon is apparent in Figure 1, 
which depicts the share of cash and liquid asset holdings of total assets for the sample of 815 
firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2008. 
Considering the financial difficulties the recent subprime crisis and the following recession 
has caused for many firms, the increased level of liquidity has not necessarily been a bad 
thing. However, Bates et al. (2009) argue that in fact, the massive reformation of the 
informative and technological environment in the financial markets should have led to the 
opposite outcome – a decrease in cash holdings. For instance, hedging opportunities have 
 
Figure 1: Development of the cash and liquid asset holdings to total assets- ratio within the 815 
sample firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2008. Average of year-end 
figures. See section 4 for further details of the sample construction. 
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become more effective enabling one to get protection from adverse shocks. Moreover, the 
expansion of capital markets in terms of technology, information and liquidity have made it 
easier to raise external funds. Holding large cash reserves for a sudden need of liquidity is 
thus becoming less and less justifiable. 
In other words, financial markets are evolving towards the assumptions of the efficient capital 
markets theory. Frictions between firms, capital markets and investors are becoming smaller 
as the information flow is increasing all the time. In the light of this development, the motives 
and drivers for the increasing cash holdings are very interesting. One way to approach this 
question is the viewpoint of investors; how do they conceive the fact that managers are piling 
up cash in their balance sheet and how is this valued? 
This is the question my thesis attempts to give answers to. The topic has already encouraged 
research focusing on how cash is valued and which factors have most effect on the valuation. 
A major part of this research revolves corporate governance issues and investor protection. 
My focus in this thesis is asymmetric information, which is a fundamental part of the efficient 
capital markets theory. Furthermore, it is another market characteristic that should have 
improved along the rapid development of the financial markets. 
The thesis follows the very recent study by Drobetz et al. (2010). They investigate two 
opposing hypotheses that originate from two fundamental theories of finance. Based on the 
pecking order theory by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), the authors argue that 
cash holdings provide financial slack. This asymmetric information theory predicts that cash 
is valuable when a firm suffers from information problems because raising external funds 
would be relatively expensive due to adverse selection. In the opposite, the agency cost theory 
by Jensen (1986), predicts that cash is less valuable for firms suffering from information 
problems because it leads to moral hazard; managers have a tendency to waste internal funds 
when they are unreachable from the control by capital markets, also known as the free cash 
flow problem. The two hypotheses predicting opposite outcomes for the valuation of cash 
under information asymmetries are also tested in this thesis. 
My study extends previous research by studying the information problems and firm valuation 
also in connection with the growth opportunities of the firm. Previous literature states that 
growth opportunities are one of the factors having the most effect on the valuation of cash 
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(e.g. Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004 and Opler et al., 1999). Moreover, I perform the 
empirical tests with data from a single market (US firms), whereas earlier literature has 
analyzed international samples with relatively large differences between countries. The 
within-market setting enables me to examine whether investors account for firm-specific 
information problems also in a market that is generally considered as the most developed 
financial market in the world. 
My empirical methodology utilizes the modified Fama and French (1998) valuation 
regression that controls for several variables; earnings, net assets, R&D expenses, interest 
expenses and dividends. To measure the level of asymmetric information I use four proxies 
that earlier research has found to be connected to information problems: (1) error in analysts’ 
forecasts, (2) forecast dispersion, (3) the number of analysts following the firm, and (4) firm 
size. The proxies are combined into an information asymmetry- index to be included to the 
valuation regression as a single variable that captures all the available information. The data 
set comprises of 815 NYSE listed firms over 9 years, totaling to 5,596 firm-years. 
The empirical results show that for an average firm, a marginal dollar of cash is valued close 
to par i.e. one dollar. This is in line with the findings of previous studies. When the effect of 
information problems is included I find no significant change in the valuation of cash. The 
results contrasts to Drobetz et al. (2010) who report a significant negative valuation for cash 
under asymmetric information. In order to go beyond existing literature, I combine the effect 
of information problems and the growth opportunities of a firm, measured by the common 
market-to-book ratio. The sample split to low and high MB firms reveals that the valuation is 
not equal for all firms. The results suggest that firms with low growth opportunities 
experience a lower valuation of cash when information problems are present. This supports 
the agency cost theory, as it seems that investors are not placing value on cash holdings 
because they are afraid that managers are not using it to value-adding purposes. For firms 
with high growth opportunities I am unable to find a significant effect and thus no support for 
the asymmetric information theory. 
On a final note, to clarify differences among some of the earlier studies I bring forth the 
definition of cash and financial slack, which in this thesis is defined as cash and liquid asset 
holdings. The notation is emphasized, because academic literature sometimes refers to 
financial slack strictly as cash held in the bank account. On the other hand, cash at bank plus 
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liquid asset holdings plus committed bank financing have been referred as financial slack (see 
e.g. Hadlock and James, 2002). In my opinion, liquid asset holdings can justifiably be 
considered as cash since they are available for use solely on the managers’ discretion. One 
could argue that this is the case with committed bank financing, but drawing credit implies 
monitoring from the creditor’s side on what the funds are being used for. I also point out that 
the terms asymmetric information, information asymmetry and information problems are used 
interchangeably in the thesis. 
1.2. Limitations of the study 
Data related issues are the main limiting factor for the results presented in this thesis. Firstly, 
the quality of the data is not perfect with many missing observations in the time-series data 
set. As the topic relates to information problems, the fact that firms with missing data are 
skipped when running the regressions might create a bias towards firms that have better data 
access and thus might suffer less from asymmetric information. Secondly, constructing the 
time-series data by including only firms that have data available throughout the time period 
creates potential survivorship bias. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) further note that the Worldscope 
database, which is used in the thesis, is biased towards large firms, which in general are seen 
to have less information problems (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003). The total impact of these 
data related problems seems to be that firms with most information problems may potentially 
be excluded from the sample. Consequently, the effect of information asymmetry on the 
valuation of cash may be understated. 
Another limiting aspect from the empirical perspective is the measurement of the level of 
firm-specific information asymmetry. As a concept, asymmetric information between the firm 
and the financial markets is subjective, and thus accurate measures are practically impossible 
to construct. Nevertheless, financial literature has successfully created proxies for asymmetric 
information and their significance and reliability have been reported in several studies (see 
e.g. Drobetz et al., 2010; Autore and Kovacs, 2010). All the proxies used in the thesis follow 
the ones already tested in financial literature. 
Finally, the implications for the valuation of cash with and without information asymmetry 
are subject to the statistical estimation capability of the valuation model. The regression 
introduced by Fama and French (1998), presented in Journal of Finance, has been widely 
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applied in financial literature particularly for the purpose of valuing cash holdings since (e.g. 
Drobetz et al., 2010; Dittmar and Mahr-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). The model 
includes several firm-specific control variables and has been modified by following research 
by adding variables that measure the contribution of certain firm characteristics, such as 
information asymmetry. 
1.3. Structure of the study 
My thesis begins by reviewing the relevant academic literature. I introduce the financial 
theories that are fundamental for the topic of this thesis and also review the empirical results 
of earlier research. 
Based on the theory, I state the hypotheses that form the basis of the empirical tests in section 
3. In section 4 I go through the applied methodology: First, I show how and which proxies I 
use to measure the degree of firm-specific information asymmetry. After that, I introduce the 
valuation model that is used to estimate the value of cash as such and in connection with 
asymmetric information. The section also discusses the research setting and statistical issues. 
Data and descriptive statistics of the sample are shown and analyzed in Section 5. In section 6 
I present the results of my empirical tests and do a comparison with previous research. 
Conclusions and avenues for future research are presented in section 7. 
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2. RELEVANT THEORIES AND LITERATURE 
In this section I review the relevant theories. I start by introducing the agency theory and the 
free cash flow problem. Then I go through the implications of asymmetric information, which 
leads us to the pecking order theory and the concept of financial slack. As mentioned in the 
introduction, financial slack and the free cash flow form the two competing hypotheses. In 
order to compare these two theories from a broader theoretical perspective, I also review other 
motives for a firm to hold cash. Finally, I report the findings earlier research has made on the 
valuation cash. 
2.1. Agency costs and free cash flow 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency relationship as a contract under which a principal 
engages an agent to perform services on her behalf. If we assume that both parties are utility 
maximizers, it becomes obvious that the interests of the principal and the agent are not always 
aligned. Because the contract involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent, agency costs arise from attempts to decrease the divergence between interests. First, the 
principal can limit divergences from his interests by establishing incentives for the agent to 
act according to his preferences. Similarly, by monitoring the principal can limit the agent to 
take unwanted actions that might harm her. Secondly, the agent can incur bonding costs by 
guaranteeing that she will not take certain actions. In spite of these restricting means, the 
divergence between the interests of the two parties will remain in most cases. The result is a 
reduction in the welfare of the principal, the residual loss, which is also a cost of the agency 
relationship. 
More recently, Eisenhardt (1989) presents a view of the agency theory with slightly different 
definitions. He suggests that there are mainly two problems that arise from the agency 
relationship. For joint-stock corporations, whose governance is a typical example of 
separation of ownership and control his view incisively summarizes the problem, consisting 
of 
1) Goal congruence problem, which consists of the conflicting objectives between the 
agent and the principal, and of the principal’s troubles in confirming the true actions 
of the agent. 
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2) Risk sharing, which arises from the differing risk taking preferences of the principal 
and the agent. 
The argument by Jensen (1986) is that managers are tempted to waste the excess cash in a 
way that destroys the value of the firm i.e. the welfare of stockholders. Managers are likely to 
act this way because of the different utility maximization functions. They might overinvest in 
order to pursue abnormally high growth since they gain from more power and non-pecuniary 
benefits. Together with the increasing size of the firm managers’ compensation increases and 
they might receive more prestige (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). On the other hand, because of 
the separation of ownership and control managers do not fully bear the cost from a bad 
investment like the shareholders do. In essence, the problem comes down to motivating 
managers to forgo the excess cash and pay it out to shareholders as dividends instead of 
wastefully retaining it.  
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as the excess cash that is needed to fund all projects with 
positive net present value. In other words, the conflicts of interest between the managers and 
shareholders are especially severe when a firm has or is producing a substantive amount of 
cash, has no investment opportunities available, and when the asymmetry of information is 
high. The above-mentioned firm specific variables are utilized in my research setting in order  
to spot the potential free cash flow problem. 
2.2. Information asymmetry 
Asymmetric information between market participants arises when they do not share the same 
amount of information. The case of particular interest in finance is a transaction in which one 
party has better information than the other. Information asymmetry in an economical setting 
was first examined by Akerlof (1970). His example from a used cars’ market has become a 
classical reference for the problems arising from asymmetric information. 
The assumption by Akerlof (1970) is that there are only two types of cars in the market, good 
cars and bad cars, which are called lemons. Information about the quality of a car can be 
collected through time. Thus, the estimate for the probability q of a car being a good one 
becomes more accurate when a buyer of a new car has owned it for some time. The problem 
is that the buyer of a used car does not know whether a car is good or bad. The seller on the 
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other hand, has superior information about the quality of the car. It follows that a good car has 
to sell for the same price as a bad car because it is impossible for the buyer to tell the 
difference. She only wants to pay the price corresponding to the average quality of a car. 
What follows from the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers is adverse 
selection problem. The sellers of lemons are better off since they gain the difference between 
the true price of a bad car and the average price. In the opposite, the sellers of good cars lose 
because they get the average price, which is lower than the true price of a good car. 
Consequently, only bad cars are offered in the market. Akerlof (1970) also argues that 
therefore the average quality of goods and the size of the market tend to go down. 
1.1.1. Financing hierarchy 
Financing hierarchy and the pecking order theory are covered in this section. Although the 
pecking order as such is not the focus of this study, the theory is reviewed in order to 
completely understand the factors affecting the valuation of financial slack. 
The model by Akerlof (1970) has been extended to cover different markets, including the 
financial markets. Most relevant for the topic of this thesis is the relationship between the 
firm and its shareholders, because most of the valuation sensitive factors are based on the 
information held by the investors. Myers and Majluf (1984) apply Akerlof’s model to study 
the effects of asymmetric information when a firm raises capital to finance a new investment. 
Their model suggests the pecking order theory, according to which firms will initially prefer 
internal funds over debt, and debt over equity in order to minimize adverse selection costs.   
Internal financing i.e. retained earnings or cash, is the first choice of financing because it is 
not annoyed by asymmetric information and is thus frictionless. In case internal financing is 
not available and the private information held by managers (which they do hold given 
asymmetric information) is favorable, the firm is better off when issuing securities that are 
least affected when the private information is disclosed to the markets, i.e. debt. On the other 
hand, when the private information held by managers is unfavorable, the firm is better off 
issuing equity because it is riskier than debt. Therefore, the asymmetry of information 
between well-informed managers and the less-informed equity and debt investors leads to 
firms preferring internal funds over external financing, creating a hierarchy of financing 
choices. The fact that managers will issue securities when they are overpriced results in a 
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discount in the price the investors are willing to pay for the securities, since they are aware of 
the managers’ incentive. To avoid the potential underinvestment problem that occurs, firms 
prefer using internal funds to avoid informational problems in the first place. 
Leary and Roberts (2010) note that the pecking order behavior might as well be a 
consequence of other economic factors, such as agency costs and taxes. Still, most of the 
research regarding the pecking order has concentrated in determining the extent to which 
firms follow the pecking order in their financing decisions. Empirical evidence for the 
pecking order theory has been rather mixed, however. Support for the theory has been found 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999): Their view is that the pecking order offers as an 
”excellent first-order descriptor of corporate financing behavior” as they show that a 
significant fraction of mature firms’ financing deficits are financed with debt. 
However, the significance of the results by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is reduced by 
Frank and Goyal (2003), who, by extending the sample to include smaller firms and by using 
more recent data, provide evidence violating the pecking order theory. Specifically, firms 
appear to issue more equity relative to debt. Fama and French (2005) present similar results as 
they discover an interesting, increasing trend in net equity issuance. Of their sample firms 
between 1973 and 1982, 54% make net equity issuance each year. This amount increases 
significantly by time, totaling to 72% between 1993 and 2002. Gross issuance of equity is 
found to be even higher, the fraction being 86% in the last sub-period. The results indicate 
that there are ways to issue equity with low transaction costs and minor asymmetric 
information, which contradicts with the assumptions of the pecking order. 
Very recently, Autore and Kovacs (2010) present interesting evidence on the interrelation of 
information asymmetry and equity issues. They study the relative change in the level of 
information asymmetry and find that firms that have narrowed the information gap (from 
being at high levels in recent past) are more likely to issue equity than debt. The authors argue 
that this results from the firms being prone to adverse selection and thus they have more to 
gain by issuing equity when possible. The findings can be seen in line with the pecking order. 
In essence, they imply that the financing hierarchy is a dynamic process; when information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers declines, the firm can go up in the hierarchy 
of financing choices. 
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Another explanation for the higher equity issuance than suggested by the pecking order, is 
offered by Lemmon and Zender (2004). They argue that debt capacity concerns prevent firms 
issuing debt. Thinking of debt capacity concerns, we could argue that they could be mitigated 
by having financial slack, which itself is a product of the pecking order theory. However, this 
study does not attempt to take a hold on to the existing pecking order research, but to focus on 
how cash as a provider of financial slack, and how this liquidity is valued under information 
asymmetry. I thus intentionally exclude the predictions that the pecking order theory has for 
financing decisions regarding debt or equity, and investigate financial slack separately. 
Nevertheless, should financial slack prove to be valuable, it would speak in favor of the 
pecking order theory. 
2.3. Why do firms hold cash? 
According to the theorem of perfect capital markets by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the 
capital structure nor the amount of cash holdings have an effect to value of a firm. Yet, the 
capital markets in a real world are not perfect and there are opportunity costs, costs related to 
raising new capital, costs for holding liquid assets and finally, costs related to the agency 
relationship.  
2.3.1. Financial slack 
As was discussed in the section concerning financing hierarchy, firms have a tendency to 
prefer internal funds to debt, and debt to equity. Referred to as the pecking order of financing 
choices, it originates from the adverse selection costs related to external financing, which in 
turn is due to asymmetric information between corporate insiders and investors (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). In the bottom of the pecking order is cash, which a firm can use as decided. 
However, the reason why companies don’t usually hold large amounts of cash idle in the bank 
count is opportunity cost. As an alternative for the cash holdings, the company could invest 
the funds in positive NPV-projects or other types of assets that provide a higher return. As a 
consequence, a firm must balance between the marginal costs of holding cash and the 
marginal benefit of investing it. 
The fundamental idea of financial slack is that when a firm suffers from a high degree of 
information asymmetry, the benefits for holding cash exceed the opportunity cost. As Myers 
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and Majluf (1984) argue, the benefit from holding cash becomes relatively higher since now 
the firm can avoid raising external finance from the capital markets, which is costly. Thus, the 
financing hierarchy theory creates a motive for holding cash in spite of the costs when 
information asymmetry is high. It also follows that in relative terms, financial slack is most 
valuable for a firm with high growth opportunities, since not being able to raise funds for an 
investment results in higher opportunity cost. 
2.3.2. Agency costs of free cash flow 
The agency costs of free cash flow that were discussed earlier also create a motive for holding 
cash. Rather than being in the shareholders’ interest, it is the managers who are willing to 
hold cash because it allows investing in projects of their choice without the shareholders’ 
approval or debt holders’ monitoring (Jensen, 1986). There are several reasons for the 
managers’ willingness to invest in non-profitable projects that have already been discussed. 
Moreover, managers are unwilling to pay out cash as dividends, since this would restrict their 
authority regarding their usage, as raising new funds would institute new monitoring.  
The bottom line is that if the free cash flow theory holds, cash should be less valuable for 
firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry. 
2.3.3. Other reasons to hold cash 
In addition to financial slack and agency costs there are other motives for firms to hold cash, 
as presented by Bates et al. (2009). The most significant ones that have attracted attention in 
the literature are discussed in the following in order to give a complete picture of the topic. 
The transaction motive for holding cash relates to the costs that arise when a firm converts 
cash substitutes into cash in order to make payments. Raising funds from the capital markets, 
liquidating assets and reducing investments or dividends all generate costs for the firm if it 
runs out of liquid assets. Thus, to avoid costs from frequently raising new funds, a firm is 
better off by holding a buffer of cash.  
The transaction motive seems to relate to financial slack as a motive for holding cash, since 
they both arise due to costs arising from using other sources of financing. However, the 
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differentiating factor between the two is asymmetric information and the resulting adverse 
selection. Transaction motive for holding cash should occur independent of whether a firm 
suffers from information asymmetry, whereas financial slack should become valuable only in 
case of asymmetric information. Thereby, I should be able to detect financial slack if cash 
holdings for firms with higher information asymmetry are more highly valued, controlling for 
other factors. 
The precautionary motive says that a firm should hold cash to be able to survive adverse 
shocks that might also lead to abnormally high costs when raising external finance (Bates, 
2008) 
Empirical evidence supporting the precautionary motive mostly has to do with financial 
constraints and investment opportunities, presented by Opler et al. (1999) and Almeida et al. 
(2004). They find that firms whose access to capital markets is bad and whose cash flows are 
riskier hold more cash than their more stable peers. On the other hand, Opler et al. (1999) also 
suggest that firms with better growth opportunities hold more cash. The reason is that 
financial distress and adverse shock can be relatively more costly, as these companies would 
be forced to forgo profitable investments. The precautionary motive can be separated from 
financial slack because of information asymmetry, similar to the reasoning with the 
transaction motive. 
Of all the motives stating reasons for holding cash, I only examine the agency motive and the 
financial slack motive, which are relevant from the perspective of information problems. 
2.4. Valuation of cash 
The traditional view is that cash is considered as having zero NPV and thus, in perfect capital 
markets the market value of a firm should increase by one dollar given a one-dollar increase 
in cash. However, this may not be the case in real, imperfect capital markets. 
Motivated by the differing theories, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) use Fama and French 
(1998) regression approach in their seminal working paper to examine how investors value 
cash holdings and which factors affect the valuation. The results reveal interesting insight on 
how cash is valued. The average valuation clearly supports the traditional view; the estimates 
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for the value of a marginal dollar ranges from $0.94 to $0.97. When the sample is split 
according to firm characteristics, a large cross-sectional variation occurs as the estimate range 
widens from $0.27 to $1.76. The factors mostly affecting the valuation of cash are the growth 
options for the firm, volatility of its investment opportunities, and the magnitude of 
stockholder-bondholder conflicts. The findings are basically supportive for both of the views 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986) highlighting the positive valuation effect of 
growth opportunities and in the opposite, the negative effect of having excess cash, also 
argued by Harford (1999). 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) focuses on the predictions of agency theory regarding firms’ holdings 
of cash. The implication studied in the paper is that the value of cash holdings is less in 
countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling 
shareholders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. This is because 
investors would discount the value of cash since they expect it is partly wasted as private 
benefits. It follows that in countries with poor investor protection dividends should be valued 
at a premium. Empirical tests use the Fama and French (1998) valuation regression modified 
to recognize cash and non-cash components with various measures of investor protection 
across countries. Specifically, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find that a dividend payment equaling 
1% of a firm’s assets increases firm value by 9,8% in poor investor protection countries 
(identified as being below the median) and only 4,07% in other countries. Results strongly 
support both hypotheses, stating that differences in the intensity of agency problems do affect 
the valuations of firms in different countries.  
Dittmar and Mahr-Smith (2007) examine the effect of corporate governance on the value of 
excess cash and also find that the dollar value is considerably less for a firm with bad 
corporate governance. The results also show that poorly governed firms dissipate excess cash 
more quickly on value destroying investments than their well-governed peers. As a 
conclusion, governance increases firm value by improving the use of cash holdings. 
Correspondingly, the results indicate that cash policy i.e. how much cash to hold, can in fact 
matter very little when the firm is well governed. 
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2.4.1. Value of cash under asymmetric information 
The implication from the pecking order theory is that cash creates financial slack when 
information asymmetry is high. If a firm has sufficient cash holdings, it is able to take 
positive-NPV investments without the need to issue new capital. Otherwise, the firm may be 
forced to forgo profitable projects since the negative effects of information asymmetry when 
raising external financing will wipe away the appreciation in the firm’s market value. In 
theory, raising external funds to finance a new project would be worthwhile only when 
information asymmetry is extremely low or nonexistent. Thus, the financial slack generated 
by cash is valuable. This is one of the main implications that are tested in this thesis; a dollar 
of cash is more valuable for firms with higher information asymmetry. The inference is in 
contrast with the free cash flow theory, stating that a dollar of cash is less valued for firms 
with higher information asymmetry. 
The valuation of cash and the effect of information asymmetry are very recently studied by 
Drobetz et al. (2010). Their paper tests the two contradicting hypotheses presented above, the 
pecking order theory and the free cash flow theory, using an international sample covering 45 
countries with different degree of information asymmetry over a time period of 1995 to 2005. 
Specifically, they measure the marginal value of cash in the presence of firm-specific and 
time-varying information asymmetry by using an extended version of the Fama and French 
(1998) valuation regression and proxying information asymmetry with the dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and with an index- based measure. 
When information asymmetry is left out, the results show that the marginal value of a dollar is 
approximately one, on average. However, when a firm faces high information asymmetry the 
value of cash is significantly reduced. Cash being valued less given high information 
asymmetry supports the free cash flow theory by Jensen (1986), meaning that the costs caused 
by moral hazard problems exceeds the benefits of financial slack. Similarly, the reduced 
valuation of cash is evident when comparing developed and emerging markets with lower 
valuation occurring in the latter one. Drobetz et al. (2010) view this as a sign of worse 
corporate governance structures and thus also of higher information asymmetry. 
Evidence supporting the free cash flow theory in the presence of information asymmetry is 
also found by Lundstrum (2003). He studies the effect of internal capital market access to a 
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diversified firm’s value by comparing the cash flow per dollar of capital expenditures in 
excess of that of a portfolio of industry-matched firms. Empirical results show that when 
information asymmetry is high, the access to internal capital market has no value. This is in 
line with the predictions of the free cash flow theory; the increasing agency costs destroy the 
value from possible savings that arise when a firm is not forced to raise funds in the un-
informed external capital markets.  
However, when information problems are low, Lundstrum (2003) finds that the access to 
internal capital markets has a positive effect on firm value. The reason for this is not explicitly 
discussed, but it is most likely due to the increasing efficiency of the capital allocation 
process. It is to be noted that this might occur also in the presence of information problems, 
but it seems that capital allocation is more efficient when using internal funds in any case. 
Although the results by both Drobetz et al. (2010) and Lundstrum (2003) support the free 
cash flow theory, clear evidence against the pecking order theory cannot be found as what 
comes the preference of using internal funds before external financing. As Drobetz et al 
(2010) argue, it may not be optimal to accumulate cash in order to avoid raising external 
finance because this precautionary motive is not valued by the shareholders. In contrast, 
investors seem to think that managers are wasting it in private pet projects. 
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3. HYPOTHESES 
As appears in the literature review, the agency motive and the financial slack motive for 
holding cash predict a different valuation for cash when information problems are present. In 
this section, I summarize the predictions and state the hypotheses that are tested in the 
empirical section of this thesis. 
Financial slack is valuable for a firm that suffers from high information asymmetry. Because 
of the adverse selection problem that arises when the firm raises external finance, cash 
becomes relatively more valuable because it allows the firm to undertake new investments 
with a lower cost of capital and also to survive in case of a sudden need of liquidity. Thus, the 
value investors place for cash is higher than the replacement cost for each unit of cash. The 
first hypothesis is: 
H1: Valuation of cash is higher for firms with high information asymmetry (asymmetric 
information theory). 
In contrast, lower valuation of cash under information asymmetry results from the 
shareholders’ inability to restrain self-serving managers. Value-destroying behavior is 
attempted to limit by corporate governance mechanisms and incentives that align the 
distinctive interests. In spite of this, Drobetz et al. (2010) argue that the higher the 
information asymmetry, the more difficult it is for the outsiders to recognize value-destroying 
behavior and investments from value-increasing investments, for instance. It follows that the 
difference in the level of cash holdings required for meeting daily liabilities and buffering for 
unusual situations (which are discussed further below), and the excess part which is due to 
managerial discretion, may not be obvious to determine. Therefore, a dollar of cash may not 
be given a value of one dollar, as shareholders discount the agency costs of free cash flow 
when information asymmetry is high. Formally, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Valuation of cash is lower for firms with high information asymmetry (agency cost 
theory). 
The previous literature brings forth the effect of growth opportunities in the valuation of cash. 
For example, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) report that growth options of the firm and 
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volatility of its investment opportunities are the factors mostly affecting the valuation of cash. 
Opler et al. (1999) argues that firms with better growth opportunities hold more cash. The 
reasoning for the argument that the valuation of cash for a firm increases with high growth 
opportunities and high information asymmetry can be found from the predictions of the 
financial slack- motive; the increased liquidity allows the firm to undertake more positive-
NPV projects. Faulkender and Wang (2006) present similar argument based on their research 
on financial constrained firms, although they do not test it empirically. 
On the other hand, low growth opportunities increase the exposure of the firm to agency costs 
of free cash flow (Opler et al., 1999 and Stulz, 1990). The value placed on cash of a firm in 
this situation should be less than for a similar firm with good growth opportunities, because 
the likelihood of having agency costs that destroy firm value increases. Thus, by splitting my 
sample according to the growth opportunities of a firm I expect to find further evidence for 
the two hypotheses above. The logic is that under high information asymmetry, support for 
the financial slack- hypothesis is found if the valuation of cash increases for firms with high 
growth opportunities. In the opposite, free cash flow- hypothesis is supported if firms with 
low growth opportunities are associated with lower valuation of cash. 
H3: Under information asymmetry, valuation of cash is higher for firms with higher growth 
opportunities (asymmetric information theory). 
H4: Under information asymmetry, valuation of cash is lower for firms with lower growth 
opportunities (agency cost theory). 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the methodology used in this thesis. I start by showing how the degree 
of firm-specific information asymmetry is calculated. Then, I introduce the regression model 
and motivate the use of specific control variables. Interpretation of the model and statistical 
issues are also discussed. 
4.1. Measuring information asymmetry 
In order to measure information asymmetry at firm level I follow the approaches introduced 
in the previous literature. I combine 4 separate proxies for asymmetric information and 
construct an index to use all the information provided by the different measures, similar to 
Drobetz et al. (2010). My first two measures relate to analysts’ earnings forecasts and are 
defined by Drobetz et al (2010) as the forecast error and the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.  
Forecast error is calculated as the absolute error between the consensus forecast i.e. the mean 
of all forecasted earnings per share and the actual earnings per share. The value of the error is 
normalized by the median forecast in order to get comparability across firms (see Equation 1). 
The actual earnings per share are for the full fiscal year and the mean forecasts are taken as of 
November in the previous year. Large forecast error indicates high information asymmetry, as 
it depicts the inconsistency of information between managers and the financial markets. In the 
opposite, with consistent information the market is able to give more accurate forecasts for 
future earnings.  
The dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is defined as the standard deviation of all available 
forecasts for full year earnings per share, also taken as of November in the previous year and 
normalized by median forecast (Equation 2). To further enhance comparability of the 
measure, dispersion is converged to normal distribution by adding one (1) and taking the 
natural logarithm. According to Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), the forecast 
dispersion is an indication of the level of disagreement between analysts’ and thus, 
information asymmetry for a given firm. Exact formulas for the forecast error and forecast 
dispersion are given below. 
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It is to be noted though, that the specification of the forecast dispersion by Drobetz et al. 
(2010) differs from the one used in this thesis in terms of the time window within the 
forecasts are measured, as they use the monthly average dispersions in each year. However, 
extracting the forecasts for those months, which the data is available was not possible in this 
case. On the other hand, Drobetz et al. (2010) note regarding the forecast error that the 
forecasts in the last month of the fiscal year are not affected by industry or economy-wide 
factors, but are only driven by misestimation of firm-specific factors and thus act as a suitable 
proxy. Similarly, using forecasts from the last month of the fiscal year for calculating the 
dispersion should produce reliable proxies as well. Due to these arguments I use forecasts 
from the latest month of the year, which is November. I further rationalize this approach 
along with the previous argument; using forecasts from the end of the fiscal year sets different 
firms to a consistent starting line, as the likelihood that most value-relevant information 
regarding a specific firm has been published, increases.  
To present criticism, one could consider that forecast error and dispersion are rather measures 
of risk as they can be a result of earnings volatility. However, Diether et al. (2002) argue that 
dispersion brings forward the differences of opinion, as they find a negative relation between 
stock returns and the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the preceding stock returns. 
D’Mello and Ferris (2000) and Autore and Kovacs (2010) also present evidence supporting 
the suitability of the dispersion as a proxy. The former observe that firms with higher 
dispersion experience stronger announcement effects. The latter in turn, find that firms’ 
willingness to raise external finance is negatively related to the dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts, thus suggesting asymmetric information. 
In addition to the forecast- based proxies, Drobetz et al. (2010) use the following variables: 
firm size, R&D expenditure Tobin’s Q, and the number of analysts following a firm. Of these 
measures, I only include firm size and the number of analysts’ following the firm in my 
information asymmetry- index and leave out R&D expenditure and Tobin’s Q. My argument 
is that since R&D expenditure is an independent variable of the valuation model applied in 
this study, using it also as measure for information would result in regressing the same 
variable twice. Tobin’s Q could cause endogeneity problems as my intention is to do sample 
splits based on Tobin’n Q. 
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Firm size is used to proxy for asymmetric information because the sophistication of disclosure 
policy and the attention received by the markets tend to increase with the size of the firm, 
measured here by total assets. Thus, the smaller the firm the larger the information asymmetry 
is likely to be (Drobetz et al., 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2003).  Similarly, the number of 
analysts following the firm is related to the amount of information available to market 
participants. Information asymmetry is larger for firms with limited analyst coverage 
(Drobetz et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2006) 
However, both Drobetz et al. (2010) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) note that 
the discussed variables may be correlated to some extent but on the other hand, each of them 
contains unique information. Whereas Autore and Kovacs (2010) and Drobetz et al. (2010) 
use the discussed proxies separately alongside an index, I only use an index to exploit all 
information provided by the different proxies. Furthermore, by using several proxies 
simultaneously I can avoid possible distortion or inconsistency within one proxy, and I am 
able to incorporate it to the valuation regression as a single variable. Based on these 
arguments, my measure of information asymmetry is an information asymmetry –index 
(hereafter IAI). The index consists of the four discussed proxies that previous literature has 
found to be related to asymmetric information and for which there is data available: 
1. Error in analysts’ forecasts  
 
       (1)
 
 
2. Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
 
         (2)
 
 
 
3. Firm size 
Measured by total assets, At. 
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4. Number of analysts’ following the firm 
Measured as the number of buy/hold/sell recommendations given by different 
analysts. 
To construct the index I first calculate every firm’s quartile ranking for each proxy of 
information asymmetry for each year. Maximum (minimum) score for one proxy is thus 4 (1) 
with a higher score indicating higher information asymmetry. By adding the scores for all 
measures the total maximum score for the index totals 16 (4). Descriptive statistics of the 
index are shown in Table 3. 
4.2. The valuation model 
My methodology in estimating the value of cash applies the valuation regression originally 
introduced by Fama and French (1998). The model has been used in several studies 
examining the valuation of cash in different contexts; in connection with asymmetric 
information (Drobetz et al., 2010) and in connection with corporate governance (Pinkowitz et 
al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahr-Smith, 2007). Initial purpose of the model was to study how firm 
valuation relates to dividends, debt and the taxation of these two.  
The Fama and French (1998) valuation regression incorporates a comprehensive set of control 
variables for earnings, dividends, debt and investment with past, current and future changes. 
Spread of value over cost is used as the dependent variable. With this specification, the 
authors argue that the model captures relevant information about expected net cash flows and 
provides a view on how the value of a firm is compounded. The model “gives a striking 
picture of the richness of the information about value in investment and financing decisions” 
(Fama and French, 1998). Compared to event studies, the valuation regression focus on 
longer-term effects in value-relevant factors, as it takes into account two-year changes in the 
variables. This allows examining the effects of the firm’s known financing strategies over 
time, instead of a snapshot approach with looking at an event and the following reaction. 
Thereby, it seems that the model fits well into the context of studying motives behind internal 
financing i.e. cash. 
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When applying the model in the valuation of cash, previous research has modified the original 
specification by adding variables. I follow the version used by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). It 
builds on the pooled ordinary least squares- regression, for which the general form can be 
written as: 
Yi,t = βXi,t  + ui,t ,            (3) 
 
where Y is the observation on the dependent variable for cross-sectional unit i in period t, X is 
a 1 x k vector of independent variables observed for unit i in period t,  β is a k x 1 vector of 
parameters (coefficient), and u an error term specific to unit i in period t (Cottrell and 
Lucchetti, 2010).  
The Fama and French (1998) valuation regression as modified by Pinkowitz et al. (2006): 
 
Vi,t = α + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t 
+ β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + 
β15dVi,t+1 + β16Ci,t + εt ,           (4) 
 
where V is the market value of the firm, E is earnings, NA is net assets, RD is research and 
development expenditure, I is interest expense, D is dividends, and C is cash holdings. dXt 
denotes for past one-year change in variable X, and dXt+1 is the future one-year change. I use 
model (4) in order to find a benchmark valuation for cash without assuming information 
asymmetry. 
 
For the purpose of measuring the effect of firm-specific and time-varying information 
asymmetry, Drobetz et al. (2010) include an additional interaction term, calculated by 
multiplying cash holdings with the measure of information asymmetry. The measure itself is 
included as a separate explanatory variable to control for the direct influence of information 
asymmetry on firm value. Interaction terms were also applied by Dittmar and Mahr-Smith 
(2007) but in connection with corporate governance. As described in the earlier section, my 
measure for information asymmetry is an index, IAI, which I include in the model as an 
interaction term as well as a separate control variable. The resulting regression is the model 
used in this thesis to value cash under asymmetric information: 
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Vi,t = α + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t 
+ β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + 
β15dVi,t+1 + β16Ci,t  + β17(Ci,t x IAI)i,t + β18IAIi,t + εi,t ,     (5) 
 
In the following I go through the specific definition of each variable and its contribution from 
the valuation perspective as presented by Fama and French (1998). 
Vi,t is the market value of the firm as the total of market value of equity and book value of 
debt. As a dependent variable and scaled by total assets, it represents the value over cost. 
Value over cost is also included as a control variable with one-year past and future changes.  
Ei,t is earnings before interest and taxes. The variable controls for the effect that profits have 
on expected net cash flows. 
NAi,t is total assets less cash and liquid asset holdings. Net assets are included to control for 
the investment component of expected net cash flows. Pinkowitz (2006) introduce net assets 
as a control variable instead of total assets as in the original Fama and French (1998) 
specification because of the intention to value cash holdings. Thus my model also defines net 
assets and includes cash and liquid asset holdings as a separate variable (see below). 
RDi,t is research and development expenditure,  set zero if missing. R&D are included because 
they may contain information not adopted by the earnings variables. Furthermore, specific 
accounting practices regarding R&D may cause under or overstatement of assets.  
Ii,t is interest expense, controlling for how interest payments affect financing decisions and 
indicating the cost and proportion of debt financing. Scaled by total assets, it proxies for 
leverage policy. 
Di,t is common dividends paid. Dividends are said depict future net cash flows apart from 
earnings information and also indicate the cost of equity financing. Scaled by total assets, it 
proxies for dividend policy (Fama and French, 1998). 
Ct is cash and liquid asset holdings. 
IAIi,t is the score for the information asymmetry index for a firm. IAI is included as a separate 
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variable to control the direct effect of asymmetric information on the firm value. 
(C x IAI)i,t is the interaction term, calculated by multiplying the level of cash by information 
asymmetry- index. Drobetz et al. (2010) argue that such interaction term measures the 
dynamic effect of information asymmetry on the value of cash. 
dXt = Xt – Xt-1 denotes the past 1-year change of variable Xt, 
dXt+1 = Xt+1 – Xt is the future 1-year change of variable Xt. 
i, is a firm and t is the current year.  
To reach comparability across firms and to control for heteroscedasticity, all variables are 
scaled by total assets. Net assets for year t is excluded since the ratio to total assets would not 
provide additional information as cash and liquid asset holdings (the difference between net 
and total assets) are already in the regression as an independent variable. Rationale for having 
the change-variables in the regression is presented by Fama and French (1998); the past one-
year change is for estimating the immediate contribution of an increase/decrease to the 
valuation. Future one-year changes in turn, are meant for absorbing changes in expectations. 
Finally, dummy variables DVt are included in the model for each time period. Given the 
pooled time-series structure of the regression, the purpose of time dummies is to improve the 
fit of the model as they allow the intercept to differ across periods. 
4.2.1. Interpreting the coefficients 
In the first stage I estimate the value by running the regression without assuming asymmetric 
information i.e. excluding coefficients β17 and β18 (Equation 4). Hence, the coefficient of most 
interest is β16. Assuming that the model accounts for the market’s expectations and thus the 
changes in future net cash flows, the coefficient for cash holdings is an estimate of the market 
value of a marginal dollar of cash. Therefore, given that the valuation regression reflects all 
value- relevant information and assuming all rational markets, the value of a marginal dollar 
of cash estimated hereby should equal one (1).  
Secondly, I run the regression under asymmetric information with all the introduced control 
variables. The coefficient under inspection is the interaction variable, β17, which measures the 
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market value of a marginal dollar of cash in connection with firm-specific information 
asymmetry. Positive value for the coefficient would indicate that under asymmetric 
information, cash is more valuable than in case of perfect information, supporting the 
financial slack- hypothesis. In the opposite, negative value would support the free cash flow- 
hypothesis, as cash would be valued less under asymmetric information. 
4.3. Supporting methodology 
Drobetz et al. (2010) use two alternative methods in running their regressions: the fixed 
effects model with robust standard errors and the Fama-Macbeth method, whereas Pinkowitz 
et al. (2006) only use the Fama-Macbeth. However, my thesis takes another direction by 
comparing the fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the random effects 
generalized least squares- regression (GLS).  According to the Gauss-Markov theorem, OLS 
is the best linear unbiased estimator given the condition that the error term is independently 
distributed. However, this condition is not very likely to be met with a large panel data and in 
that case GLS may produce better estimates. (Cottrell and Lucchetti, 2010).  
Using the fixed effects estimator, it is assumed that the individual specific effect of each 
entity may be correlated with the independent variables. The random effects assumption is the 
opposite; it is presumed that individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. The random effects model produces more efficient estimators and should be 
preferred over the fixed effects if the underlying assumption holds. In contrast, if the 
assumption of uncorrelated individual effects fails, fixed effects would be valid while random 
effects would be inconsistent. 
The nature of my data set, consisting of a relatively large number of cross-sectional units and 
having a panel structure, is favoring the random effects model. Therefore I use the random 
effects model in parallel with the fixed effects. For the purpose of evaluating the consistency 
of the two models, I perform the F-test and the Hausman test. The F-test for the fixed effects 
model experiments a null hypothesis that the cross-sectional units all have a common 
intercept. More specifically, it tests whether all αi:s are equal in the fixed effects model that 
can be written as: 
yit = Xitβ  +αi + εit            (6) 
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where yit is the observation on the dependent variable for cross-sectional unit i in period t, Xit 
is a 1 x k vector of independent variables, β is a 1 x k vector of parameters, α is a unit-specific 
and time-invariant component of the error term and εit an observation-specific error term for 
unit i in period t. If the hypothesis is true, the pooled OLS produc (Hausman, 1978)es 
sufficient estimates. If the null is rejected, the random effects model may be a more efficient 
estimator (Cottrell and Lucchetti, 2010). Fixed effects is estimated using robust standard 
errors, which means robustness against heteroscedasticity. Unfortunately, the current version 
of Gretl does not offer this option for the pooled random effects. 
The Hausman test experiments the null hypothesis that the random effects estimates are 
consistent (Hausman, 1978). Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that random effects are 
biased and that fixed effects model should be used instead. The Hausman test is based on a 
variable H that follows chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equaling the number 
of time-varying independent variables of the regression. H measures the distance between the 
estimates provided by the fixed effects and the random effects estimates, and a large H would 
indicate that random effects is not consistent. H is computed via the ”regression method” as 
presented in the following (Cottrell and Lucchetti, 2010): 
H = n (SSRr – SSRu) / SSRu ,          (7) 
where SSRr  is the sum of squared residuals of the random effects- model, SSRu is the sum of 
squared residuals of the fixed effects- model and n is the total number of observations used.  
H can also be computed with the matrix-difference but with finite samples there is a potential 
problem that H may be given a negative value, which is not admissible under the chi-square 
distribution. Gretl calculates H with the regression method to avoid the problem. For further 
details of the two statistical tests, see Cottrell and Lucchetti (2010). 
4.4. Sample splits 
As a robustness check, Drobetz et al. (2010) repeat statistical tests with a measure for excess 
cash. At the same time, they note that calculating the excess cash goes against the assumption 
of the pecking order theory, since it assumes that optimal level of cash exist. Excess cash 
refers more to the free cash flow theory, which makes it difficult to separate between the two 
opposing hypotheses. Because of this reasoning, I do not incorporate excess cash.  
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In order to find more verification for the opposing theories and to extend the research on 
information asymmetry, I examine the effect of investment opportunities more closely. I do 
this by splitting the sample according to investment opportunities of the firm. As discussed in 
the hypotheses- section, this could collaborate in differentiating between the two opposing 
theories. As a proxy for investment opportunities I use the common market-to-book ratio. 
Penman (1996) argues the appropriateness of this proxy when indicating earnings growth and 
investment opportunities. Regardless of the fact that firm specific market-to-book ratio might 
be affected by firm’s financing constraints and the actual capitalization probability of the 
investment opportunities, it is commonly used in literature (e.g. Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Opler 
et al., 1999). 
Market-to-book is measured as the market value of equity divided by book value of equity, 
both measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. I divide the sample into high and low- 
investment opportunity groups by using the median market-to-book. Interpretation is similar 
with the results for the full sample. As laid out in the hypotheses, if valuation of cash under 
asymmetric information for high growth opportunity is higher, it supports financial slack. 
And again, should the value of cash be lower for low growth opportunity firms as compared 
to the whole sample, the free cash flow- theory would be supported. 
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5. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Given the fact that the Fama and French (1998) valuation regression specifies several 
variables, completing the study requires a comprehensive data set. Because of this, I use data 
from US companies due to the good availability of data. My dataset covers companies listed 
in the New York Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2009. However, as the valuation model 
includes time-varying variables that measure both the past one-year change and the one-year 
future change, my 11-year data set allows a time-series regression for 9 years. The firm-level 
data is entirely accessed through Thomson One Banker: Financial statement items used in the 
valuation regression come from the Worldscope- database, whereas the data items for the 
forecast data for the information asymmetry- index data are from I/B/E/S- database. 
5.1. Data processing 
The set of companies listed in The New York Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2009 has to 
be processed and trimmed in order to run the regressions. First of all, I exclude all financial 
firms and utility companies (ICB codes 7000- and 8000-) due to the regulative nature of the 
business that affects profitability and leverage. This is a very standard step in financial 
research of this type. Secondly, I require that all firms in the sample must have a fiscal year 
ending on 31 December. Otherwise, matching earnings forecasts for respective actual 
earnings for the IAI and calculating the change variables would be cumbersome.  
These exclusions result in 815 cross-sectional observations (number of firms) that have data 
available during the whole time period of 11 years, before considering data limitations. The 
data is not as wide-ranging as it ideally could be and as a result, the quality of the data and 
especially the frequency of observations decrease as we go further back in time. Since firms 
with missing observations have to be skipped in the regression, the number of firm years in 
my time-series regressions varies when adding variables and doing sample splits. Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006) note that the Worldscope data is biased towards large firms as they provide the 
most comprehensive time-series data. In addition, taking into account that my sample only 
includes firms having been listed in NYSE for 11 years, there is reason to suspect 
survivorship bias. In spite of this, Worldscope data is broadly used in financial studies and 
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hence in my thesis. I trim all variables at the 1% and 99% tails, similar to Drobetz et al 
(2010). Trimming is necessary to remove outliers in both ends. 
5.2. Summary statistics of regression variables 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the sample 2000-2008 
This table presents the summary statistics i.e. the mean, median, first (25%) and third (75%) 
quartile and standard deviation, for the variables used in the main valuation regression (3). The 
sample consists of annual observations for 815 cross-sectional units (firms) over 9 years. All 
variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% tails. Vt is the total market value of the firm as the sum of 
market value of equity and book value of debt. Et is earnings before interest and taxes. NAt is net 
assets (total assets less cash and liquid asset holdings). RDt is research and development 
expenditure. It is interest expense. Dt is common dividends paid. Ct is cash and liquid asset 
holdings. All variables are scaled by total assets, At. Missing observations are skipped and n 
represents the number of valid observations. 
              
Variable n Mean Median 1Q 3Q Std. Dev 
Vi,t 6049 2.108 1.181 0.870 1.720 10.336 
Ei,t 6495 0.122 0.087 0.043 0.135 0.694 
dEi,t 6333 0.010 0.008 -0.022 0.039 0.333 
dEi,t+1 6460 0.076 0.007 -0.030 0.047 1.280 
dNAi,t 6224 0.020 0.018 -0.106 0.144 0.281 
dNAi,t+1 6411 1.012 -0.003 -0.125 0.173 12.913 
RDi,t 7187 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.033 
dRDi,t 7187 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 
dRDi,t+1 7187 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.106 
Ii,t 6502 0.021 0.016 0.008 0.027 0.024 
dIi,t 6334 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.018 
dIi,t+1 6452 11.127 0.000 -0.004 0.008 74.200 
Di,t 6457 0.033 0.004 0.000 0.017 0.335 
dDi,t 6314 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.091 
dDi,t+1 6430 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.322 
dVi,t+1 6038 1.631 0.003 -0.257 0.338 22.700 
Ci,t 6445 0.136 0.062 0.021 0.164 0.263 
Ai,t 6598 5821.100 1361.500 490.560 4120.330 1684.700 
              
 
To start with, deviation within observations is relatively high for three specific variables also 
after removing outliers by trimming at the 1% and 99% tails; Vi,t, dVi,t+1 and dIi,t+1. As seen 
from Table 1, despite the trimming the mean is still significantly higher for Vi,t than the 
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median, and the standard deviation is quite large. In fact, similar pattern, or skewness in 
distribution is evident for all variables but in a lesser degree. Large variance and the skewness 
of variables are present also in the sample of Drobetz et al. (2010). 
Note that the median, 1st and 3rd quartiles for current and changes in R&D variable are zeros. 
This is because of the variable specification, which sets RDt to zero when no R&D 
expenditure is reported and when missing. If values are missing for any other variable, it is 
skipped in the summary statistic calculations and in the regressions. 
Looking at the earnings variables, Ei,t, we can see that the profitability has been quite high for 
the sample companies, median profitability being 8.7%. This can also be a result of 
survivorship bias, which is a potential issue given the sample selection criteria of companies 
being listed in NYSE for 10 years. Nevertheless, mean and median for both of the change 
variables are positive implying that profitability in average has improved during my sample 
period. This is generally in line with Drobetz et al. (2010) and Pinkowitz and Williamson 
(2004), only that my sample implies higher profitability and growth. Recalling that Drobetz et 
al. (2010) use an international sample, we may think that US firms have performed better. 
Another explanation can be found from differing time periods, as they cover years 1995 to 
2005 and we know that 2005-2008 (included in my sample) were years of substantial profit 
for many firms. 
Only negative observation in average figures is the future 1-year change in net assets, NAi,t+1, 
that can be interpreted that the share of liquid assets in balance sheet have increased more 
than other assets. The perception is analogical with the observed trend of increased cash and 
liquid asset holdings discussed in section 1. Dittmar and Mahr-Smith (2007) also report clear 
increase in cash holdings over their sample period of 1990-2003. 
Statistics for the cash and liquid asset holdings to total assets- ratio are very close to those 
reported by Drobetz et al. (2010), mean and median being 0.136 and 0.062 versus 0.126 and 
0.073 respectively.  Both samples seem to be skewed, but standard deviation appears to be 
higher in my sample. Similar levels are also shown by the sample of Dittmar and Mahr-Smith 
(2007), the median being 0.06. Interestingly, their mean value is clearly higher, 0.22, 
indicating significant skewness.  
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of variables  
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Correlations between the variables are reported in Table 2. Practically looking, notable 
correlations occur between some of the cash flow, firm value, earnings and dividend 
variables. The correlations make sense if we consider how firm value (cash flows), earnings 
and dividends are related. Therefore, I would argue that correlation of some degree between 
these specific variables is given and cannot be avoided. The sample of Drobetz et al. (2010) 
most likely experiences similar correlations, however, they are not reported. I do not expect 
the correlations between variables to cause statistical issues for the regression results. 
5.3. Summary statistics of the information asymmetry- index 
The variables used in the calculation of the information asymmetry- index (IAI) are 
summarized in Table 3. As laid out is section 4.1, the IAI consists of four proxies; Forecast 
dispersion, forecast error, number of analysts following the firm, and firm size. The 
information embedded in these proxies is combined into a single variable by calculating an 
index. The effect of asymmetric information is then estimated by including the index in the 
regression as a control variable and as an interaction variable, Ct x IAIt.  
In the following (also when not specifically mentioned) I analyze the summary statistics 
mainly in comparison with Drobetz et al. (2010), who calculate and utilize similar variables in 
their study. Note that and their sample includes data from 45 countries in total, including US 
firms.  
To start with, the comparison shows that the magnitude of my measure of forecast dispersion 
is slightly lower. As seen from Table 3, my median dispersion is 0.021 and mean dispersion is 
0.078, whereas the comparable values for US firms are 0.052 and 0.137 respectively. Since 
the formula for the calculation method is the same, there are two possible explanations for the 
discrepancy. Firstly, I measure forecasts as of November whereas Drobetz et al. (2010) 
calculate the monthly averages. Referring to the point made in section 4.1, more information 
is published towards the year-end and thus the forecasts are more accurate than, say, in 
February of the same year. Using more accurate forecasts most likely results in smaller 
dispersion among them. Secondly, the lower values for my sample could be due the use of 
more up-to-date data. Analysts’ capability of giving accurate forecasts may have improved 
along with the general development of financial markets and the more open and 
straightforward disclosure policies than ever before. This notion is further supported by the 
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fact that the standard deviation is also smaller for my sample. Yet, the two explanations are 
not mutually exclusive and probably both explain why the dispersion measure here is of lower 
magnitude. 
The above conclusion of improved forecasts is slightly weakened when comparing with 
summary statistics for forecast errors. The mean and median errors for my sample are 0.445 
and 0.249, whereas comparables are 0.344 and 0.083 respectively, indicating larger absolute 
errors for my sample. However, Drobetz et al. (2010) only report the forecast error statistics 
for all countries, and not separately for US firms. Using the previous logic, the error for US 
firms is probably even lower. Together with the earlier discussion, these findings seem to 
suggest that it is not the analysts’ capability to give forecasts in absolute terms that has 
improved, but that they are producing more accurate forecasts in relative terms, i.e. with a 
smaller dispersion. In other words, the asymmetric information measured hereby prevails 
between firms and the market. 
Moving on to the information asymmetry- index itself, we can observe the following 
distribution of scores: 1st quartile is at 8, median at 10 and 3rd quartile is at 12. Recall that the 
minimum and maximum scores are 4 and 16. Comparison for the index is not as 
straightforward as the scale of Drobetz et al. (2010) is different, ranging from 5 to 25. 
Nevertheless, we can calculate the relative degree of asymmetric information against the 
original scale as follows: My median score cuts at the 10 / (16) = 62.5% point of the whole 
scale, and the comparable median cuts at the 14 / (25) = 56%. The standard deviation is 
somewhat smaller (2.788 vs. 3.290), which is probably due to the smaller scale for the 
information asymmetry- index. The figures indicate that my sample represents slightly higher 
information asymmetry in general. However, since we know that the proxies and the 
composition of the index differ from each other we cannot confirm this conclusion. 
Unfortunately, Drobetz et al. (2010) do not disclose statistics for the interaction terms or for 
the number of analysts following the firm to allow for comparison. From Table 3 we can see 
that there are 10 analysts following a firm on average, the median being 9 analysts. 25% of 
firms have coverage by more than 14 analysts and 25% have less than 5. The interpretation of 
the statistics for the interaction terms that are a product of two variables is trivial and is thus 
left out.   
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the variables for the information asymmetry- index 
This table presents the summary statistics i.e. the mean, median, first (25%) and third (75%) quartile and 
standard deviation, for the variables used in the calculation of the information asymmetry- index (IAI). The 
sample consists of annual observations for 815 cross-sectional units (firms) over 9 years. Forecast error is 
the absolute error between the consensus forecast for full year earnings per share normalized by median 
forecast, and measured as of November of the current year. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of 
all available forecasts for full year earnings per share normalized by the median forecast, both observed as 
of November of the current year. Number of analysts following the firm is measured as of number of 
(buy/hold/sell) recommendations given. IAI is based on four proxies, the three above-mentioned, and the 
size of the firm, measured by total assets, At (see Table 2 for summary statistics for At). IAIt is calculated as 
follows: First, every firm’s quartile ranking for each 4 proxies of information asymmetry for each year is 
calculated. Maximum (minimum) score for one proxy is thus 4 (1) with a higher score indicating higher 
information asymmetry. By adding the scores for all measures the total maximum (minimum) score for the 
index totals 16 (4). The interaction term in the valuation regression that is based on the index (Ct x IAIt) is 
also shown. Missing observations are skipped and n represents the number of valid observations. The IAI 
can be calculated for 5074 firms in total. 
              
Variable n Mean Median 1Q 3Q Std. Dev 
Forecast dispersion 5115 0.078 0.021 0.009 0.061 0.208 
Forecast error 5490 0.445 0.249 0.074 0.510 0.628 
Number of analysts 5655 10.190 9 5 14 7.250 
IAIt 5074 10.066 10 8 12 2.788 
Ct x IAIt 4959 1.177 0.557 0.187 1.478 1.732 
              
 
In general, the summary statistics for my sample seem to be about the same levels with 
Drobetz et al. (2010) who use the same data source but a different time period, which in half 
overlaps with mine. Yet, variance for several variables in the valuation regression is 
significantly higher, indicating that there are some discrepancies and extreme values in both 
ends, also known as ”fat tails”. As this is not the case for all variables and considering the 
somewhat limited sample size, eliminating additional observations is not reasonable. We can 
still conclude that the sample is satisfactory but perhaps of a lower quality compared to the 
earlier studies in the field. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This section presents the results of my empirical tests. I start by covering the whole sample 
and running the valuation model without information asymmetry in order to get a benchmark 
value for cash. Continuing with the whole sample, I then include the interaction variables and 
run the regressions assuming asymmetric information. 
In section 6.3 the sample is split according to the investment opportunities of the firms. The 
purpose of the sample split is to study the effect asymmetric information has on the valuation 
of cash in low versus high growth environment. 
6.1. Valuation of cash without asymmetric information 
The model under scrutiny in this section is regression (4), the reduced model that does not 
account for asymmetric information. Variables lacking from the main valuation regression (5) 
are the interaction variable β17, and the control variable for the level of firm-specific 
asymmetric information, β18. Hence, the coefficient of interest is β16. The purpose for running 
the reduced model without assuming asymmetric information is to get a benchmark value for 
cash holdings, against which I can compare the results that include information problems, 
reported in the following sections. Furthermore, many studies value cash as such (e.g. 
Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004) or in connection with corporate governance (e.g. Dittmar 
and Mahr-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Benchmark value allows the comparison with 
these studies and thus an evaluation how well the sample and the valuation model performs. 
Regression results are shown in Table 4. Results are for the full sample, covering the years 
from 2000 to 2008 with a total of 5596 firm-year observations.  First column of Table 4 
presents the coefficient values assuming fixed effects estimator and robust standard errors. T-
values and statistical significance are shown in column 2. For comparison, columns 3 and 4 
state coefficients and t-values for the random effects estimator. Regressions are run assuming 
both fixed and random effects in order to find the best statistical model for estimating the 
value of cash. Theoretical background for the alternative estimators is discussed in section 
4.3. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the valuation of cash 
This table presents the regression results for the valuation of cash without asymmetric information using 
model (3). The sample consists of annual observations for 815 cross-sectional units (firms) over 9 years. 
All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% tails. The dependent variable is Vt, the total market value 
of the firm as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. Et is earnings before interest 
and taxes. NAt is net assets (total assets less cash and liquid asset holdings). RDt is research and 
development expenditure. It is interest expense. Dt is common dividends paid. Ct is cash and liquid asset 
holdings. dXt = Xt – Xt-1, denoting the past 1-year change of variable Xt, and dXt+1 = Xt+1 – Xt is the 
future 1-year change of variable Xt. All variables are scaled by total assets, At. Missing observations are 
skipped and thus n represents the number of observations used in the regressions. Both specifications 
include time dummies. * denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% 
level. 
                
  Fixed effects   Random effects 
Variable Coefficient t-value     Coefficient t-value   
Ei,t 3.689 9.067 ***   3.729 18.040 *** 
dEi,t -1.287 -3.846 ***   -1.154 -8.963 *** 
dEi,t+1 0.095 1.521     0.100 3.531 *** 
dNAi,t 0.197 1.619     0.163 2.527 ** 
dNAi,t+1 -0.003 -0.115     -0.002 -0.283   
RDi,t 8.551 8.721 ***   8.419 15.390 *** 
dRDi,t 6.651 1.574     6.563 3.594 *** 
dRDi,t+1 -0.265 -0.519     -0.296 -1.132   
Ii,t 2.020 2.083 **   1.670 2.165 ** 
dIi,t -1.079 -0.518     -1.354 -1.155   
dIi,t+1 -0.001 -3.684 ***   0.000 -1.760 * 
Di,t 6.000 7.079 ***   5.919 35.280 *** 
dDi,t 1.937 -1.332     -1.917 -8.203 *** 
dDi,t+1 2.001 3.178 ***   2.034 19.510 *** 
dVi,t+1 -0.025 -1.028     -0.032 -5.596 *** 
Ci,t 0.752 3.442 ***   0.765 11.550 *** 
                
Constant 0.777 11.770 ***   0.871 18.040 *** 
R2 0.809             
Adjusted R2 0.775       
Standard error 1.034       1.045     
n 5596       5596     
                
 
I begin with the results run under the fixed effects assumption, which is considered as the 
primary specification in my study, similar to Drobetz et al. (2010). From Table 4 we can see 
that the coefficient for the variable Ct is 0.752, which is statistically significant at the 1% level 
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(t-value 3.442) Based on the specification of the regression this can be interpreted as the value 
for a marginal dollar of cash. Fit of the model appears to be moderate as R2 is 0.809. 
Interpretation of R2, the coefficient of determination, is such that a value of 1 would imply a 
perfect fit between the regression model and the data. To point out, the high R2 value here 
could be due to the high number of control variables. Standard error of the regression is also 
moderate at 1.034. 
Previous studies have provided somewhat similar estimates for the value of a marginal dollar 
of cash. Still, many of them provide estimates that are closer to 1 dollar in value. For instance, 
the estimates by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) for equal definition of cash (cash holdings 
and marketable securities) range between 0.94 and 0.97. Their sample consists of US firms, 
but in a notably larger scale as they include all Compustat firms between 1952-1997. Due to 
the more comprehensive sample, their estimate may also be more accurate. Moreover, they 
estimate the coefficients using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) method whereas I concentrate 
on the fixed vs. random effects estimation. The marginal value for cash reported by Dittmar 
and Mahr-Smith (2007) is also close to 1 dollar. For a mean firm in their sample, cash 
holdings are given a value of approximately 1.09 on average. The authors note, however, that 
as they study the interrelation of cash and corporate governance their sample only includes 
firms with either very strong or weak governance, leaving out the ones in the middle. For this 
reason, the estimates are not totally comparable and may explain the higher value. Finally, 
using the Compustat firms from 1972 to 2001, Faulkender and Wang (2006) find an average 
marginal value for cash of 0.94. 
In spite of the fact that the studies compared here are different in terms of sample period, 
coverage over time and the estimation method, they suggest that the value placed on cash 
holdings is close to 1. This is consistent with the perfect capital markets theory, which views 
cash having a zero NPV and is thus valued at its nominal value. It is interesting that the most 
recent studies, being Drobetz et al. (2010) and this thesis, both estimate a slightly lower value 
for cash than the earlier ones. According to Drobetz et al. (2010), the value of cash with the 
fixed effects assumption is 0.661, also significant at the 1% level. However, the sample is 
different from mine in the sense that in addition to US firms, it includes firms from 44 other 
countries. The authors argue that the lower marginal value of cash may be a result of taxes on 
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payouts. The reason why tax effects do not decrease the value of cash in the earlier studies is 
unfortunately not discussed in their paper. On the other hand, it is logical that the results are 
alike as the model specification and data processing are attempted to be similar. 
Looking at the coefficients for control variables in Table 4, we can identify the ones being 
statistically significant for firm valuation: At 1% level, significant contribution comes from 
earnings and dividends, which is not surprising considering how firm value is determined. 
Similar findings are also evident in the results of Drobetz et al. (2010). Besides earnings and 
dividends, they also find that net asset variables and the change in total firm value are 
significant factors. In contrast, my results do not suggest the significance of these variables 
but instead propose that R&D expenses are highly significant. The abnormally high 
coefficient value may indicate some inconsistency within the variable. Recall that the R&D 
expense variables are set to zero is missing or not reported, following the approach by 
Drobetz et al. (2010). However, together with Pinkowitz et al. (2006) they observe equally 
high statistical significance for R&D variables, also with the same variable definition. 
Therefore it seems that the variable construction and its impact to the valuation regression is 
in line with earlier studies and that my sample does not present any additional distortion in 
this sense. 
Moving on to the random effects estimation shown in the two rightmost columns of Table 4, 
we can see that the model claims more variables to be statistically significant than with fixed 
effects. Specifically, the change in earnings, net assets, R&D expenses and in the total market 
value of the firm as well as current interest payments are all significant at the 5% level or 
better. In spite of this, the absolute changes in the coefficients compared to the fixed effects 
estimation are only minor; for instance, the coefficient for the value of cash hardly changes as 
it increases from 0.752 to 0.765. All in all, the random effects model suggests that more 
variables have a significant effect on firm valuation. 
As discussed in section 4.4, I perform the F-test and the Hausman test to be able to evaluate 
between the consistencies of the two alternative estimators. The F-test statistic for differing 
group intercepts for is 1.147. Corresponding p-value is 0.00450 and so the null hypothesis is 
rejected at 1% significance level. The test indicates that the assumptions of the pooled OLS 
using fixed effects are not met and that the random effects could produce more efficient 
estimates. 
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Consequently, I perform the Hausman test that indicates whether the null hypothesis of 
random effects producing consistent estimators, is true. The Hausman test-statistic, H, under 
the chi- square distribution and with 24 degrees of freedom is 67.290. P-value for H is 5.581e-
6 and so we reject the null hypothesis at 1% significance level. In other words, the test implies 
that the assumption of uncorrelated individual effects and regressors do not hold and for this 
reason, the fixed effects model should be preferred over the random effects. This is despite 
that the underlying assumptions for the fixed effects do not hold either. The fact that both 
tests reject the null hypothesis suggests that some other estimator may produce the most 
efficient estimates for this specific data set. Determining the optimal statistical model further 
than by analyzing the relative performance of the two chosen estimators is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
Drobetz et al. (2010) use the Fama and Macbeth (1973) method along the fixed effects 
estimation, similar to Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004). Value of cash estimated hereby is 
1.792, which is significantly higher and well above 1. Based on the findings throughout the 
literature, the Fama and Macbeth- method appears to produce higher estimates. 
Based on the review of the results against the previous findings, I would argue that the model 
construction and the sample perform expectedly in estimating the value of cash. An 
interesting finding is that Drobetz et al. (2010) and my thesis, being the most recent studies 
with the most up-to-date data, both estimate lower values for cash holdings than studies using 
older data. This seems to indicate that investors have not appreciated firms piling up cash in 
their balance sheet. 
6.2. Valuation of cash under asymmetric information 
This section reviews empirical results for the full sample taking into account the firm-specific 
degree of asymmetric information. The model under scrutiny is now regression (5), which 
includes the interaction variable β17 and the control variable for asymmetric information, β18. 
As the data set is not perfectly comprehensive, the IAI cannot be calculated for all firms and 
thus the number of observations available for the regression drops to 4,733 from 5,596. 
Unfortunately, this approach probably excludes the firms with the highest level of information 
asymmetry i.e. those for which no proxies are available in the first place. 
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Table 5: Regression results for the valuation of cash under asymmetric information 
This table presents the regression results for the valuation of cash under asymmetric information 
using model (4). The sample consists of annual observations for 815 cross-sectional units (firms) 
over 9 years. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% tails. The dependent variable is Vt, the 
total market value of the firm as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. Et is 
earnings before interest and taxes. NAt is net assets (total assets less cash and liquid asset holdings). 
RDt is research and development expenditure. It is interest expense. Dt is common dividends paid. 
Ct is cash and liquid asset holdings. IAI is the information asymmetry- index that captures the firm-
specific degree of information asymmetry. dXt = Xt – Xt-1, denoting the past 1-year change of 
variable Xt, and dXt+1 = Xt+1 – Xt is the future 1-year change of variable Xt. All variables are scaled 
by total assets, At. Missing observations are skipped and thus n represents the number of 
observations used in the regressions. Both specifications include time dummies. * denotes statistical 
significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
                
  Fixed effects   Random effects 
Variable Coefficient t-value     Coefficient t-value   
Ei,t 4.379 12.250 ***   4.500 30.750 *** 
dEi,t -1.500 −4.810 ***   -1.384 -9.988 *** 
dEi,t+1 0.144 2.585 ***   0.157 6.211 *** 
dNAi,t 0.101 0.868     0.096 1.538   
dNAi,t+1 0.024 1.928 *   0.030 5.598 *** 
RDi,t 7.123 8.263 ***   7.019 14.360 *** 
dRDi,t 5.858 1.561     5.836 3.732 *** 
dRDi,t+1 0.086 0.284     0.027 0.112   
Ii,t 3.386 3.577 ***   3.085 4.170 *** 
dIi,t 0.537 0.328     0.045 0.038   
dIi,t+1 -0.001  −2.677 ***   -0.001  −2.166 ** 
Di,t 2.692 4.353 ***   2.585 6.501 *** 
dDi,t -1.123 −1.758 *   -1.005 −2.717 *** 
dDi,t+1 -0.059 -0.204     -0.088 -0.620   
dVi,t+1 -0.026 −1.987 **   -0.034 −6.573 *** 
Ci,t 2.320 3.714 ***   2.311 6.391 *** 
IAIt 0.009 1.259     0.009 1.588   
Ci,t x IAI -0.055 -0.965     -0.060 -1.870 * 
                
Constant 0.627 6.702 **   0.632 8.533 * 
Adjusted R2 0.375             
Standard error 0.819       0.839     
n 4733       4733     
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To start with the fixed effects estimation, the coefficients and respective t-values shown in the 
two leftmost columns of Table 5 appear to be roughly similar with those estimated earlier 
without asymmetric information. Statistical significance is also suggested for mostly the same 
control variables. Adjusted R2 decreases from 0.775 to 0.375 for the reduced model, which 
indicates that the explanatory power of the regression relative to the previous specification, 
does not improve when the additional variables are included. 
From the two leftmost columns of Table 5 we can see that coefficient values for IAIt and Ct x 
IAIt are 0.009 and -0.055 respectively and no statistical significance is suggested. As 
explained in section 4, IAI is included in the regression to control the direct influence 
information problems may have on firm valuation. Based on the insignificant coefficient 
value however, it seems that there is no notable effect. Similarly, the insignificant interaction 
term does not indicate that information problems would affect the valuation of cash either. 
If we look at the random effects estimation, the interaction term is assigned a negative 
coefficient value of -0.060, which is slightly significant at 10% level. The coefficient for the 
IAI is practically equal to the fixed effects i.e. not significant and close to zero. According to 
the F-test for differing group intercepts, the random effects estimates could be more efficient, 
as the null is rejected at 1% with F being 1.286 (p-value 1.044e-6). The Hausman test 
statistic, H, under the chi-square distribution and with 26 degrees of freedom is 65.228. With 
a p-value of 3.19e-5 the null hypothesis is also rejected at 1% level. According to the tests, the 
fixed effects model performs better and thus we should focus on these estimates. 
My results are in contrast to those of Drobetz et al. (2010), who report a corresponding and 
highly significant coefficient value of -0.280 for the interaction term. They assign a 
significant negative value also for the information asymmetry- index, which implies a 
negative effect on the valuation. Coefficient values remain negative when the authors apply 
the Fama-Macbeth method and other measures for asymmetric information apart from the 
index. The authors interpret this as clear evidence for the free cash flow theory. 
Most likely, the main explanation for the divergence in the results is the sample, which in 
Drobetz et al. (2010) is international covering 45 countries. In particular, the sample includes 
countries classified as emerging markets and countries with less developed market disclosure 
practices and investor protection. Further tests that are done separately for developed 
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countries and for emerging markets reveal that the negative effect is much stronger for the 
emerging markets, which is line with the findings by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). The effect for 
the developed countries is also negative and highly significant, but not as strong as for 
emerging markets. 
The value proposed for the coefficient for cash holdings, Ct, increases considerably to 2.320 
and is statistically significant at 1% level. Similar increase is evident also in Drobetz et al. 
(2010) but the authors do not discuss the behavior of this variable, as the focus is on the 
additional variables that account for asymmetric information. According to the model 
specification, the interaction term captures the effect of information problems on the valuation 
of cash. Since the coefficients estimated for this variable and for the IAIt are not statistically 
significant, I follow the interpretation of Drobetz et al. (2010) and argue that the increase in 
the coefficient for Ct is not caused by the inclusion of asymmetric information. Interpreting Ct 
as the value for marginal dollar of cash in this model specification with the IAIt and the 
interaction variable added would not be reasonable. 
In spite of the results being somewhat mixed, it appears that information problems do not 
have a negative effect on the valuation of cash for an average US firm. This finding is in 
contrast to previous research that has studied other developed economies along with 
developing economies. Therefore, I am unable to find evidence for neither of the hypotheses 1 
or 2. The level of asymmetric information does not seem to provide the explanation for the 
contrasting results since it is approximately the same for both my sample and the one in 
Drobetz et al. (2010) (see section 5 for descriptive statistics). It appears that in the US 
investors seem to consider cash holdings more or less irrelevant for firm valuation even 
though information problems are present. 
6.3. Results for sub-samples 
This section incorporates sample splits according to the investment opportunities of the firm 
for the purpose of isolating the effect of asymmetric information. Whether a firm has 
investment opportunities available is argued to be a relevant factor from the perspective of the 
two opposing theories. If we assume high information problems, a firm with low investment 
opportunities is more likely to suffer from agency costs of free cash flow as there are no 
justifiable targets for placing excess cash. Then again, a firm that has several investment 
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opportunities would benefit from ample cash holdings because of the pecking order theory, 
which states that raising external finance is expensive when asymmetric information is high 
(Opler et al., 1999). 
Common market-to-book (MB) ratio is used for a proxy for investment opportunities, 
measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firms with market-to-book ratio below the 
median value are put in the group of low investment opportunities and firms above the 
median value are referred to as having high investment opportunities. I start by analyzing the 
sub-sample of firms with low investment opportunities. 
6.3.1. Firms with low investment opportunities 
Regression results for the low investment opportunity sub-group are presented in Table 6. The 
median market-to-book is 0.882 so the sub-sample consists of firms with having MB below 
this value. Number of observations in the regression for the sub-sample is 2,345. 
Starting with the fixed effects estimation, a direct comparison of the coefficients between the 
low MB group and the full sample is that the values are much lower in magnitude for the low 
MB group. Most coefficient values are below one and variation across variables is lower. The 
only variable increasing in coefficient value is interest expense, It. Potential reason behind the 
smaller coefficient values could be that sub-sampling according to investment opportunities 
might also have resulted in a more balanced panel. Approximately same variables are 
statistically significant at 1% level than for the full sample regressions. Based on these 
arguments, it appears that the model produces coherent results despite the reduced sample 
size. 
From the second column of Table 6 we can see that the coefficient for Ct declines notably 
when compared to the full sample results. Coefficient value is now -0.593, indicating 
significance at 1% level. Similarly, IAI is assigned a highly significant value of -0.013. 
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Table 6: Regression results for the valuation of cash under information asymmetry. Sub-sample 
for low MB- firms 
This table presents the regression results for the valuation of cash under asymmetric information for 
low Market-to-book firms using model (4). Division into high and low Market-to-book sub-groups 
is done by using the median value. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% tails. The 
dependent variable is Vt, the total market value of the firm as the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of debt. Et is earnings before interest and taxes. NAt is net assets (total assets less cash 
and liquid asset holdings). RDt is research and development expenditure. It is interest expense. Dt is 
common dividends paid. Ct is cash and liquid asset holdings. IAI is the information asymmetry- 
index that captures the firm-specific degree of information asymmetry. dXt = Xt – Xt-1, denoting the 
past 1-year change of variable Xt, and dXt+1 = Xt+1 – Xt is the future 1-year change of variable Xt. 
All variables are scaled by total assets, At. Missing observations are skipped and thus n represents 
the number of observations used in the regressions. Both specifications include time dummies. * 
denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
                
  Fixed effects   Random effects 
Variable Coefficient t-value     Coefficient t-value   
Ei,t 0.522 4.571 ***   0.541 8.943 *** 
dEi,t -0.241 −2.352 **   -0.189 -3.884 *** 
dEi,t+1 0.031 2.705 ***   0.024 2.842 *** 
dNAi,t 0.146 3.678 ***   0.102 4.799 *** 
dNAi,t+1 0.000 -0.104     0.001 0.735   
RDi,t 0.612 2.147 **   0.364 1.517   
dRDi,t 0.721 0.778     0.302 0.390   
dRDi,t+1 -0.004 -0.086     -0.057 -0.836   
Ii,t 7.055 17.650 ***   6.962 26.270 *** 
dIi,t -1.906 -3.660 ***   -2.114 -4.763 *** 
dIi,t+1 0.000 -1.261     0.000 0.417   
Di,t 1.758 4.143 ***   1.610 9.132 *** 
dDi,t -0.791 -2.462 **   -0.547 -3.804 *** 
dDi,t+1 -0.039 -0.712     -0.035 -0.717   
dVi,t+1 0.000 0.026     -0.002 -1.039   
Ci,t -0.593 -2.690 ***   -0.607 -3.086 *** 
IAI -0.013 -5.230 ***   -0.012 -5.641  *** 
Ci,t x IAI 0.050 2.609 ***   0.052 2.985 *** 
                
Constant 0.794 23.750 ***   0.790 28.500 *** 
R2 0.447             
Standard error 0.204       0.212     
n 2345       2345     
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Most importantly, the interaction term Ct x IAIt experiences a statistically significant value of 
0.050. Despite not having a negative value, it points out that the valuation of cash in 
connection with information asymmetry is practically zero. Recall that the benchmark value 
for cash estimated previously is 0.752. I interpret these findings being in favor of hypothesis 4 
and the free cash flow theory. Cash being valued at zero dollars indicates that investors doubt 
managers’ ability to find profitable use for the cash holdings of firms that are lacking of 
investment targets. However, my results do not support the presumption that investors would 
suspect managers’ ability to undertake only profitable investments, also a prediction of the 
free cash flow theory. 
My results confirm the argument by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) that low growth 
opportunities have a negative effect on the valuation of cash. They also add to the findings of 
Opler et al. (1999) who show that firms with low investment opportunities hold less cash than 
peers with better investment opportunities. According to my results these firms experience a 
lower valuation on their cash holdings too. On the other hand, Opler et al. (1999) present 
evidence that managers have a tendency to accumulate cash when they have an opportunity to 
do so, which flags for potential agency problems. My results suggest, however, that investors 
suspect the motives behind the increasing cash and consequently discount for agency costs of 
free cash flow when considering the value of liquid assets. 
The random effects model produces very similar coefficients for the low MB sub-sample, as 
is evident from the two rightmost columns of Table 6. For instance the coefficients for cash, 
IAI and the interaction term are very alike in value and all significant at 1% level. The random 
effects model thereby confirms the above stated findings but fails in statistical coherence: the 
Hausman test gives a very large H of 83.365 and the null is rejected with p-value of 6.291e-8. 
The outcome is the same as with the earlier models, fixed effects should be preferred over the 
random effects, in spite of that the underlying assumptions are not perfectly met (the F-test 
rejects at 1% significance level, F being 1.561 with a p-value of 8.687e-9). 
6.3.2.  Firms with high investment opportunities 
Empirical results for the sub-sample of high investment opportunity firms are presented here. 
The number of observations for the sub-sample is 2,388. Although the sample is split in half 
by using the median value, the two sub-samples are not exactly equal in size since there is a 
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random number of missing observations in both sub-samples that are skipped when running 
the regressions. 
Based on the coefficient values seen in Table 7, the high MB sub-sample seems to be 
somewhat different from the low MB sub-sample. Whereas the coefficients previously were 
mostly below one there is now much more variation between variables. Furthermore, 
statistical significance is suggested for variables different from the low MB sub-sample. 
In contrast to the low MB sub-sample, information asymmetries cannot be reported to have a 
distinct effect on the valuation of firms with good investment opportunities; the fixed effects 
coefficient for the IAI controlling for the direct influence of information problems is 0.015 
and not statistically significant. Interestingly, the valuation of cash in connection with 
asymmetric information for the sub-sample, presented by the interaction term, is addressed a 
negative coefficient value. This is not statistically significant, however. The expected sign for 
the coefficient according to hypothesis 3 would have been positive, as firms having profitable 
projects available would benefit from holding cash for to be used in financing. Because of 
information problems, cash would be the preferred funding choice over the expensive external 
funds. 
On the other hand, the value for the cash holdings variable Ct is 1.924 and significant at 1% 
level. From this perspective, the high investment opportunity firms experience a higher 
valuation for their cash holdings than firms with low investment opportunities. Nevertheless, I 
interpret the results based on the coefficients on the IAI and the interaction term, as explained 
earlier in accordance with the full sample results. Thus, for firms with good investment 
opportunities, information problems do not seem to have a distinct effect on the valuation of 
the firm or its cash holdings. 
Opler et al. (1999) report that firms with good opportunities regarding new investments hold 
more cash than other firms. They argue that this is partly due to outside funds being 
expensive, which can be caused by information asymmetries. However, my findings suggest 
that the markets do not appreciate this. 
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Table 7: Regression results for the valuation of cash under information asymmetry. Sub-sample 
for high MB- firms 
This table presents the regression results for the valuation of cash under asymmetric information 
for high Market-to-book firms using model (4). Division into high and low Market-to-book sub-
groups is done by using the median value. The sample consists of annual observations for 338 
cross-sectional units (firms) over 9 years. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% tails. The 
dependent variable is Vt, the total market value of the firm as the sum of market value of equity 
and book value of debt. Et is earnings before interest and taxes. NAt is net assets (total assets less 
cash and liquid asset holdings). RDt is research and development expenditure. It is interest expense. 
Dt is common dividends paid. Ct is cash and liquid asset holdings. IAI is the information 
asymmetry- index that captures the firm-specific degree of information asymmetry. dXt = Xt – Xt-1, 
denoting the past 1-year change of variable Xt, and dXt+1 = Xt+1 – Xt is the future 1-year change of 
variable Xt. All variables are scaled by total assets, At. Missing observations are skipped and thus n 
represents the number of observations used in the regressions. Both specifications include time 
dummies. * denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
                
  Fixed effects   Random effects 
Variable Coefficient t-value     Coefficient t-value   
Ei,t 5.580 11.270 ***   5.508 23.290 *** 
dEi,t -0.911 -3.180 ***   -0.897 -3.646 *** 
dEi,t+1 0.632 3.161 ***   0.693 7.462 *** 
dNAi,t 0.575 3.955 ***   0.533 4.753 *** 
dNAi,t+1 0.107 2.805 ***   0.092 6.677 *** 
RDi,t 6.940 6.666 ***   7.396 11.000 *** 
dRDi,t 7.153 1.634     6.742 3.171 *** 
dRDi,t+1 2.619 2.172 **   2.386 3.604 *** 
Ii,t 5.660 3.634 ***   6.551 5.114 *** 
dIi,t -1.808 -0.710     -2.692 -1.418   
dIi,t+1 0.000 -0.820     -0.001 -1.828 * 
Di,t 0.702 1.076     0.276 0.481   
dDi,t 0.655 0.790     0.708 1.183   
dDi,t+1 -0.342 −1.06     -0.199 -0.745   
dVi,t+1 -0.143 -3.220 ***   -0.141 -9.371 *** 
Ci,t 1.924 2.732 ***   1.587 3.204 *** 
IAI 0.015 1.423     0.016 1.591   
Ci,t x IAI -0.015 -0.220     -0.004 -0.081   
                
Constant 0.750 5.100 ***   0.788 6.587 *** 
R2 0.464             
Standard error 0.942             
n 2388       2388     
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The discovery goes along with the efficient capital markets theory as it is expected that the 
firms with high investment opportunities are able to raise funds rather easily. Therefore, the 
amount of cash held in the balance sheet should be irrelevant for firm value. The outcome is 
actually somewhat controversial. In general, firms having high investment opportunities are 
also experiencing rapid growth. Especially for these firms, future prospects between the firm 
and financial markets i.e. information asymmetry, tends to be high. One could argue that a 
relatively high amount of liquid asset holdings could mitigate potential constraints that could 
occur when raising new funds. Nevertheless, my results don’t address a distinct valuation of 
cash holdings for these firms. 
The results do not change with the random effects estimation, which produces roughly the 
same estimates. Interestingly, now the null hypothesis of the F- test is not rejected: F is 1.012 
with a p-value of 0.434. The results imply that for the high MB sub-sample, the fixed effects 
pooled OLS is adequate estimator and that the random effects can be discarded, even though 
not being notably different. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Corporations hold more cash in their balance sheets than they did a few decades ago. 
According to financial theory, having too much cash is not optimal from the shareholders 
point of view because of opportunity cost; cash can be invested to earn an additional return 
and increase value. If company management is unable to find investment targets, the excess 
cash that is not needed should be returned to shareholders as dividends. On the other hand, the 
perfect capital markets theory states that cash holdings as such, are irrelevant and do not have 
an impact to the value of the firm. This is because both the firm and investors share exactly 
the same information and thus raising external funds is frictionless. As we know, however, 
financial markets in real life are not perfect. On reasonable terms we can therefore suspect the 
assumption of irrelevant cash holdings. 
This thesis focuses on this controversy and attempts to measure the effect that asymmetric 
information has on the value of cash. Measurement of the firm-specific level of information 
asymmetry is done by constructing an index consisting of four proxies that earlier research 
has found to be connected to information problems: (1) error in analysts’ forecasts, (2) 
forecast dispersion, (3) the number of analysts following the firm, (4) firm size. I use a panel 
data set consisting of 815 US firms over 9 years, totaling 5,596 firm-years and utilize the 
modified Fama and French (1998) valuation regression. The regression estimates the value of 
a marginal dollar of cash and isolates the effect of firm-specific asymmetric information by 
controlling for the level and change in earnings, net assets, R&D expenses, interest expenses 
and dividends. 
Previously, several studies have investigated the valuation of cash empirically and found that 
on average, a dollar of cash is valued approximately at par. The estimates range generally 
between 0.661 and 1.09. My empirical results for the full sample without including the effect 
of information problems are in line with the earlier findings. The valuation regression 
indicates a value of 0.752 for a marginal dollar of cash. 
Constructing the information asymmetry- index in a similar manner with Drobetz et al. (2010) 
reveals that by these measures, the degree of information problems in my sample of US firms 
is approximately the same than for the average firm in their sample of 45 countries. When I 
include the firm-specific information asymmetry in the valuation, I find that it has no 
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significant effect on the valuation of cash. This is in contrast to Drobetz et al. (2010) who 
report a significant negative effect for all sub-samples, also for developed countries. The US 
sample used in my thesis seems to differ from other developed markets; although information 
problems exist it has no notable effect on the valuation of cash holdings.  
However, the valuation of cash changes when the sample is split according to the growth 
opportunities of the firm, measured by the common market-to-book ratio. The results show 
that information asymmetry has a negative effect on the valuation of cash for firms with low 
investment opportunities. The findings are in support of the free cash flow theory: If a firm 
has no reasonable investment targets and low growth opportunities, managers may waste cash 
in private pet projects and self-serving, value-destroying purposes. Therefore, cash held in 
balance sheet by such firms is given no additional value, as is suggested by the results. For 
firms with high investment opportunities, I am unable to find a distinct effect on the valuation 
of cash.  
The other theory tested in the thesis has an opposite outcome. Asymmetric information theory 
predicts that raising new external funds is expensive because of the uneven information 
between the firm and the markets. Cash holdings would thus provide financial slack that 
could be used to finance new investments. However, I am unable to find support for the 
hypothesis. 
Altogether, my results contribute to existing literature by suggesting that the effect of 
information problems on the valuation of cash is limited to firms with low investment 
opportunities. For an average firm, the effect is non-existent. The results are based on US 
firms and contradict to earlier findings that report a negative effect for developed countries 
also for an average firm. 
Explanation why the results for US firms differ from other developed markets studied in 
earlier research could potentially be due to the higher efficiency its capital markets. Higher 
efficiency enables better allocation of funds and easier access of new capital, and may not be 
as sensitive to the differences in the level of information between market participants. On the 
other hand, managers’ actions and objectives may be more transparent and better understood 
by the markets. This supports the well-known efficient capital markets theory, which states 
that the level of cash held in the balance sheet is irrelevant for firm valuation. Nevertheless, 
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firms with low investment opportunities should be aware of swelling amounts of cash and 
excess liquid asset holdings. My findings suggest that investors would rather have that money 
on their own bank accounts than on the disposal of corporate managers. 
As my thesis has shown, the effect that information problems have on firm valuation can 
differ also between developed markets. Future research could thus take a grasp on other 
countries apart from the US to disentangle the differences between markets for example in 
Europe. Current studies are also limited on how information problems are measured. As 
mentioned, data requirements for gathering a sufficient sample may intrinsically lead to the 
exclusion of firms with the highest levels of information asymmetry. From this perspective a 
study based on a small, carefully selected sample covering firms from both extreme ends 
could give a new insight on how information problems affect the valuation of these firms.
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